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DOMINIC P. PARKER*

Land Trusts and the Choice to
Conserve Land with Full Ownership or
Conservation Easements
ABSTRACT
Land trusts are nonprofit organizations that conserve
environmental amenities on private land. Trusts can conserve
land by owning it outright or holding conservation easements.
This article describes the economic tradeoffs of these two
conservation methods. Relative to full ownership by a land trust,
conservation easements generate higher transaction costs. The
trust and landowner will exert time and money to specify,
monitor, and enforce the terms of the easement throughout its
duration. Conservation easements, however, facilitate more
economical production of commodities such as crops and beef
because a separate landowner generally has a specialization
advantage in managing agricultural land. Datafrom the Land
Trust Alliance show that trusts tend to hold easements when
transactioncosts are low and gains from landowner specialization
are high. For example, most trusts use easements to preserve
scenic views over large parcels of agricultural land and use full
ownership to enhance ecological functions on non-agricultural
land. The desire to help donors of land and easements capitalize
on tax benefits, however, sometimes outweighs transaction cost
and specialization considerationsand can militate against the use
of cost-reducingconservation methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
Land trusts are nonprofit organizations that preserve or enhance
environmental amenities, such as wildlife habitat and scenic views, on
private land. Over 1200 land trusts operate in local regions across the
United States.1 These organizations may influence land use indirectly by
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Anderson, Andy Dana, Chris Elmendorf, Rob Fleck, Bill Long, Dean Lueck, Roger Meiners,
David Simpson, Wally Thurman, and the participants at PERC's Forum on Private Land
Conservation. For providing data, I thank Stephen Outlaw of the Land Trust Alliance. All
errors are my responsibility.
1. See Table 1 and accompanying notes.
*
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lobbying for zoning regulations 2 or brokering land sales to government
agencies. 3 Most, however, influence land use directly by holding
property rights in one of two ways.
Land trusts may conserve land by owning it outright, thereby
acquiring the full property interest. Alternatively, trusts might hold a
conservation easement, which is a partial interest in land.4 Conservation
easements typically prohibit subdivision and commercial development
while permitting some agricultural and residential land uses.5 Many
land trusts still rely primarily on outright ownership, but conservation
easements have become more prevalent in recent years.6 Using economic
analysis, this article examines why conservation easements have become
more prevalent and why ostensibly similar land trusts control land use
with full ownership instead of conservation easements and vice versa.
In examining the tradeoffs of these conservation methods, the
article focuses on two important economic concepts: transaction costs
and specialization. Relative to full ownership by a land trust,
conservation easements generate higher transaction costs. That is, the
land trust and landowner will exert time and money to specify, monitor,
and enforce the terms of the divided ownership arrangement. 7
Conservation easements, however, may facilitate more economical
production of commodities such as crops and beef. A separate
landowner is likely to have a specialization advantage in managing
2. See Land Trust Alliance (LTA) website, Can Land Trusts Lobby?, at http://www.lta.
org/publicpolicy/lobby.htm (last visited July 30,2004).
3. Of the 760 state and local land trusts that had conserved land by 1998,
approximately 24 percent had transferred some acreage to government agencies. Only

eight percent, however, had transferred more than 50 percent of their acreage to
government agencies. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, 1998 NATIONAL DIRECTORY OF
CONSERVATION LAND TRUSTS (1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter 1998 NATIONAL

DIRECTORY].
4. See infra notes 39-58 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of conservation
easements. For a more thorough legal analysis of conservation easements and their
relationship to common law easements and covenants, see Gerald Korngold, Privately Held
Conservation Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in the Context of in Gross Real Covenants and
Easements, 63 TEX. L. REV. 433, 435-40 (1984); Andrew Dana & Michael Ramsey,
Conservation Easements and the Common Law, 8 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 2, 4-21 (1989); Peter M.
Morrisette, Conservation Easements and the Public Good: Preserving the Environment on Private
Lands, 41 NAT. REsOuRcEs J.373, 379-96 (2001).
5. For a list of permitted and prohibited uses in a sample of recently acquired
conservation easements, see Dominic P. Parker, Estimating the Costs of Stewarding Disparate
Conservation Easements: A Case Study of Western Land Trusts, 9 THE BACKFORTY: THE NWSL.

OF LAND CONSERVATION L. (Hastings College of Law), Summer 2003, at 1,3.
6. See Table 1 and accompanying notes.
7. See infra Part III and accompanying notes 84-87 (discussing the concept of
transaction costs); see infra text accompanying notes 92-97 (applying specifically to
conservation easements); see also infra Part IV and text accompanying notes 110-113.
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agricultural land. 8 This article fleshes out these tradeoffs and describes
factors that lower the transaction costs of holding easements.
If land trusts had perfect incentives to minimize the long-run
costs of providing environmental amenities, and transaction costs and
specialization were the only considerations, we should expect these
tradeoffs to dominate their choice of conservation method. Of course,
land trusts have imperfect incentives and other factors motivate their
decisions. Most prominently, land trusts anxious to conserve land have
incentives to help donating landowners maximize tax benefits. 9 Yet the
conservation method that maximizes tax benefits may not be the same as
that which minimizes the costs of providing environmental amenities
over the long run. In addition to examining whether transaction costs
and specialization are generally important considerations in land trust
decisions, this article examines the extent to which these factors enter the
decision calculus when trusts rely exclusively on donations from
landowners.
The article proceeds as follows. Section II briefly reviews the
history of the land trust movement in the United States. This section
describes land trusts, delineates land trust and easement growth trends,
and highlights changes in state legislation and federal tax incentives that
have (presumably) affected conservation decisions. Section III describes
the concepts of transaction costs and specialization and how they help
explain whether a firm contracts for or owns assets. This section also
applies these concepts in a land trust setting. Section IV uses transaction
cost theory to generate predictions about land trust behavior. The section
emphasizes key differences in the costs of each conservation method
when land trusts enhance, rather than simply preserve, environmental
amenities. Section V describes "land trust census data" compiled by the
Land Trust Alliance.' 0 These data are used to assess the extent to which
trusts' portfolios of land and easements mitigate transaction costs and
exploit gains from specialization. Also using data described in section V,
section VI examines the extent to which various tax incentives trump
these considerations. Finally, section VII concludes the article with a
simple policy prescription for encouraging cost-effective conservation
decisions.

8. See infra Part III and text accompanying notes 88-89 (describing the concept of
landowner specialization); see infra text accompanying notes 90-91 (applying specifically to
land trusts); see also infra Part IV and text accompanying notes 113-114.
9. Federal and state tax benefits are discussed in text accompanying notes 61-80 in
Part II.
10. See infra Part V and accompanying notes 119-121.
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II. THE LAND TRUST MOVEMENT
The Land Trust Alliance (LTA) defines a land trust as a
"nonprofit organization that, as all or part of its mission, actively works
to conserve land by undertaking or assisting direct land transactionsprimarily the purchase or acceptance of donations of land or
conservation easements." 1 Most enjoy charitable status and exemption
from federal and state income taxes and are governed by an unpaid
board of trustees charged with the responsibility of managing land trust
assets. Trustees cannot enrich themselves with trust assets and are
supposed to manage the assets for trust beneficiaries. 12 Because land
trusts enjoy charitable status and the attendant tax privileges, their
beneficiaries are often broadly defined to include the general public.' 3
The most conspicuous public beneficiaries, however, are those who
reside in the region in which a land trust operates and include people
who have regular physical or scenic access to land conserved by land
trusts.
A. Growth of Land Trusts
The first land trust was probably the Massachusetts Trustees for
Reservation, formed in 1891.14 The motivation for the trust was to
"establish an organization with a board of trustees that would have
power to hold lands free of taxes.. .for the use and the enjoyment of the
public."' 5 Other organizations with similar doctrines, such as The Block
Island Land Trust in Rhode Island (1896) and The Society for the
Protection of New Hampshire Forests (1901), emerged shortly
16
thereafter.

11.

LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, 2000 NATIONAL LAND TRUST CENSUS, at http://www.lta.

org/aboutlt/census.shtml

(last visited July 30, 2004) [hereinafter 2000 LAND TRUST

CENSUS].
12. The term land trust, however, is somewhat of a misnomer. See SALLY K. FAIRFAX &
DARLA GUENZLER, CONSERVATION TRUSTS 21 (2001) ("Because land trusts hold land or
easements that are generally intended to benefit the public, critical elements of a fiduciary
relationship are apparent. However, not many [land trusts] are structured as true trusts or
even operate under any semblance of trust principles.").
13. Id. at 26.
14. Gordon Abbot, Jr., Historic Origins, in PRIVATE OPTIONS: TOOLS AND CONCEPTS FOR

LAND CONSERVATION 150-52 (Barbara Rushmore et al. eds., 1982).
15. Id. at 150.
16. 1998 NATIONAL DIRECTORY, supra note 3, at 119.
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The major growth in the number of land trusts began in the
second half of the twentieth century. As Table 117 illustrates, there were
approximately 53 land trusts in 1950, 308 in 1975, 887 in 1990, and 1263
in 2000.18 Of the 1263 local and regional land trusts identified, most are
located in the Northeast (39 percent), Midwest (15 percent), and the MidAtlantic regions (14 percent). From 1990 to 2000, the greatest percentage
increase in the number of land trusts occurred in the South Central (127
percent) and Southwest (119 percent) regions. 19
The growth in the acres controlled by state and local land trusts
is also impressive. 20 The acres held in full-interest and conservation
easements increased from approximately 737,000 in 198521 to almost
866,000 in 1990 and up to 3.8 million acres by 2000. 22 State and local land
trusts in the Northeast region control the most acres (1.4 million) and
23
land trusts in the South Central region control the least (72,356). The
greatest percentage increase in acreage controlled has occurred in the
Southwest, Southeast, and South Central regions. 24 On a statewide basis,
land trusts in Montana and New York control the most acres with
454,689 and 416,194 respectively. 25 Land trusts in Hawaii and Arkansas
control the least with 8 and 953 acres respectively. 26 From 1990 to 2000,
the most rapid growth in acres controlled by state and local land trusts
occurred in South Dakota (803,900 percent) and Nevada (53,207 percent)
and negative growth occurred in Alabama (-60 percent), Mississippi (-19
27
percent), and New Hampshire (-2 percent).
Relative to fee-simple ownership, conservation easements have
gained prevalence in recent years. From 1990 to 2000, the percent of land
controlled by state and local land trusts held in conservation easements
17. Data for Table I were gathered from LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, SUMMARY DATA FROM
THE NATIONAL LAND TRUST CENSUS, at http://www.lta.org/newsroom/census_
summary.data.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2004) [hereinafter SUMMARY DATA].
18.

2000 LAND TRUST CENSUS, supranote 11.

19. See Table I for sources and regional definitions.
20. Land that is "controlled" by land trusts excludes the 2.4 million acres of land that
has been transferred to government agencies. See SUMMARY DATA, supranote 17.
21.

LAND TRUST EXCHANGE, 1985-86 NATIONAL DIRECTORY OF LOCAL AND REGIONAL

LAND CONSERVATION ORGANIZATIONS viii (compiled by Pamela K. Stone, 1985).
22. SUMMARY DATA, supra note 17. For perspective, consider that 3.8 million acres is
larger than three states -Connecticut, Delaware, and Rhode Island. This acreage, however,
does not include at least 1.75 million acres of land controlled by national land trusts such as
The Nature Conservancy and Ducks Unlimited. 1998 NATIONAL DIRECTORY, supra note 3.
23. SUMMARY DATA, supra note 17.
24. Id.
25.

Id.

26. Id.
27. Id. The loss in acreage presumably occurred because land trusts in each state
transferred a significant amount of their land to government agencies during the 1990s.
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increased from 52 to 68 percent.28 During the same period, land held in
conservation easements increased 475 percent while fee-simple land
increased only 186 percent. 29 Land trusts in six of the eight regions now
control over half of their land with conservation easements and, from
1990 to 2000, the percent of acres controlled with conservation easements
increased in five of the eight regions.30
While these figures illustrate a general trend towards the use of
conservation easements, their prevalence varies across regions and
states. The smallest percentage of acres held in easements occurs in the
Midwest (41 percent) and in the Pacific (44 percent) regions. 31 The largest
percentage occurs in the Northwest (96 percent) and the Southeast (77
percent). 32 On average, about 56 percent of land controlled by land trusts
in each state is held in conservation easements varying from zero percent
in Oklahoma, Nevada, and North Dakota to nearly 100 percent in
33
Montana, Minnesota, Louisiana, and Colorado.
Land trusts provide a variety of environmental amenities on the
land they control. More than half of state, local, and regional land trusts
report protecting wetlands and river corridors.34 Over 40 percent of
trusts report protecting watersheds, farmlands, ranchlands, or endangered species habitat.35 Less than 40 percent of trusts report protecting
amenities such as scenic views, recreational trails, and timberland
(working forests). 36
Finally, some land trusts do more than provide environmental
amenities by controlling land use. In 2000, 72 percent of land trusts said
that they offered programs in environmental education and 51 percent
said they participate in land use planning. 37 In an earlier study, almost 50
percent of land trusts reported involvement in ecological restoration,
biological monitoring and research, or management activities for rare
species. 38

28.

SUMMARY DATA, supra note 17.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

38.

1998 NATIONAL DIREcTORY, supra note 3.

SUMMARY DATA, supra note 17.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B. Conservation Easements and Statutory Legislation
A classic analogy is useful for describing a conservation
easement. Think of land as a bundle of sticks. Each stick represents a
right to use land, or exclude others from using the land, in a particular
manner. A conservation easement transfers some sticks from the landowner's bundle to the land trust for a specified duration (usually
perpetuity). A more comprehensive definition is found in the Uniform
Conservation Easement Act:
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"Conservation easement" means a nonpossesory interest of
a holder in real property imposing limitations or
affirmative obligations the purposes of which include
retaining or protecting natural, scenic, or open-space values
of real property, assuring its availability for agricultural,
forest, recreational, or open-space use, protecting the
natural resources, maintaining or enhancing air or water
quality, or preserving the historical, architectural,
archeological, or cultural aspects of real property. 39
A conservation easement may prevent landowners from activities such
as developing, subdividing, clear-cutting, over-grazing, or erecting
billboards. An easement may require landowners to build fences,
maintain trails, or perform other tasks. Finally, an easement may grant
the land trust rights to construct recreational structures, conduct
scientific studies, and plant or remove vegetation.40
The rights conveyed in conservation easements "run with the
land." That is, successor landowners (and possibly successor land trusts)
are generally bound to the terms of the easement agreed upon by the
original parties. As John Walliser notes, "It is this intention to bind
persons succeeding the original landowner that distinguishes
conservation servitudes from other contractual arrangements." 41 Indeed,
this distinction is a reason why conservation easements are property
rights, not contractual rights, and helps explain why enforcement of
conservation easements is dubious under a common law regime.42
Most conservation easements, as a primary objective, restrict
landowners from engaging in certain land uses. Yet the common law
does not generally recognize negative easements.43 Cases in which the
benefits of negative easements accrue to owners of adjacent parcels are

39. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT Acr § 1(1), 12 U.L.A. 51 (1981).
40. For a discussion of provisions common to conservation easements, see Parker,
supra note 5, at 3; JANET DIEHL & THOMAS S. BARRETT, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT
HANDBOOK 156-208 (1988); STEVEN BICK & HARRY L. HANEY, JR., THE LANDOWNER'S GUIDE
TO CONSERVATION EASEMENTS 41-78 (2001).
41. John Walliser, Conservation Servitudes, 13 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 47, 48
(1997).
42. See Dana & Ramsey, supranote 4, at 12-21 (describing enforcement problems under
a common law regime).
43. Id. at 13 ("Under traditional common law regime, the only negative easements
allowed were (1) against blocking 'light and air' to a building, (2) against removing
subjacent and lateral support for a building on adjacent property, and (3) against
interfering with the flow of an artificial stream.").
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treated as exceptions," but conservation easements are intended to
benefit a broader range of public beneficiaries. 45 For this reason, courts
equating conservation easements to negative easements under common
law are unlikely to enforce agreements on successive landowners.
Alternatively, courts may interpret conservation easements as restrictive
covenants under a common law regime. 46 Covenants are often used to
prevent undesirable development within residential neighborhoods. If
courts liken a conservation easement to a restrictive covenant, however,
then they will probably still be reluctant to enforce the agreement when
the property changes ownership. Common law courts do not allow
covenants to "run with land" unless the covenant's beneficiaries own
are not
adjacent land and, again, the benefits of conservation easements
47
landowners.
adjacent
among
supposed to be concentrated
48
Because of these and more subtle common law obstacles, most49
enforcement.
for
law
modem conservation easements rely on statutory
(However, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, North Dakota, and Wyoming still
lacked easement enabling statutes as of 2000.50) Easement enabling
statutes generally include basic enforcement provisions that override
common-law defenses5' and delineate the5 2type of amenities easements
can protect along with acceptable duration.
In an attempt to standardize easement-enabling statutes, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted
44. Id. at 14 (arguing that only negative easements with "appurtenant" benefits, e.g.,
easements in which the benefits run to adjacent landowners, are likely to be enforced by
U.S. courts under a common law regime).
45. Land trust beneficiaries include the general public. See FAIRFAX & GUENZLER, supra
note 12, at 25-26.
46. Dana & Ramsey, supra note 4, at 15-16.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 12-21. See also Walliser, supra note 41, at 57-115.
49. See Roderick H. Squires, Introduction to Legal Analysis, in PROTECTING THE LAND:
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 69-77 (Julie Ann Gustanski &
Roderick H. Squires eds., 2000).
50. Id. at 72-73. Note that land trusts in Pennsylvania and Wyoming held almost
100,000 acres of conservation easements in aggregate despite not having easement enabling
statutes. See SUMMARY DATA, supra note 17.
51. Delaware's easement-enabling statute, for example, notes that a conservation
easement is valid even though (1) it is not appurtenant to an interest in real property, (2) it
can be or has been assigned to another holder, (3) it is not of a character that has been
recognized traditionally at common law, (4) it imposes a negative burden, (5) it imposes
affirmative obligations upon the owner of an interest in the burdened property or upon the
holder, (6) the benefit does not touch or concern real property, or (7) there is no privity of
estate or of contract. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6904 (2003).
52. Todd D. Mayo, A Holistic Examination of the Law of Conservation Easements, in
PROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 26-54 (ulie
Ann Gustanski & Roderick H. Squires eds., 2000).
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the Uniform Conservation Easement Act (UCEA) in 1981. 53 The UCEA
provided a blueprint for how state legislatures could take advantage of
the federal tax-code and overcome some of the common-law problems
associated with the enforceability of conservation easements. 54 Since

1981, 21 states have adopted the UCEA-many with local variations. 55
However, easement-enabling statutes in 25 states are not modeled on the
56
UCEA.
Land trusts in UCEA states probably benefit from easier
enforcement. As Table 2 depicts, UCEA statutes tend to be much more
explicit than non-UCEA statutes about what conservation easements
may protect.5 7 More explicit statutes tend to be easier to enforce,
although this may not necessarily be the case always.58

53. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT AcT, 12 U.L.A. 51 (1981).
54. Squires, supra note 49, at 70-71.
55. Id. at 72-73.
56. Id.
57. Mayo, supra note 52, at 28-30.
58. In Northeastern states, for example, case law has been used to strengthen easement
statutes that are not explicit relative to UCEA statutes. See Karin Marchetti & Jerry
Cosgrove, Conservation Easements in the First and Second Federal Circuits, in PROTECTING THE
LAND: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 78-101 (Julie Ann Gustanski
& Roderick H. Squires eds., 2000). In non-UCEA states lacking such precedent, however,
protection of environmental amenities with conservation easements can be cumbersome
because the easements must be carefully drafted to circumvent legal barriers and maintain
enforceability. For example, statutes in 15 states, including Montana, do not explicitly allow
conservation easements to be used to preserve agricultural land. Because Montana's statute
does allow for the preservation of open space, however, conservation easements in the
state are often granted over agricultural lands to preserve open space. See generally William
T. Hutton, Conservation Easements in the Ninth Federal Circuit, in PROTECrING THE LAND:
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 354-91 (Julie Ann Gustanski &
Roderick H. Squires eds., 2000).
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TABLE 2: CONSERVATION EASEMENT ENABLING STATE STATUTES
States with
State statutes
State statutes
statutes*
that are
that are not
(/ of total)
modeled after
modeled after
the UCEA
the UCEA
(% of total)
(% of total)
Total
Enacted original statute prior to
59
UCEA (1981)
Explicitly allow easements to
6°
protect following amenities:

25 (100)

21 (100)

46 (100)

18 (72)

4 (19)

22 (48)

34 (74)
19 (90)
15 (60)
Holder's purpose
27 (59)
18 (86)
9 (36)
Natural
25 (54)
(90)
19
6 (24)
Scenic
27 (59)
(86)
18
(36)
9
Open space
31 (67)
19 (90)
12 (48)
Agricultural
2 (4)
2 (10)
0 (0)
Silvicultural
(54)
25
(86)
18
7 (28)
Forest
(50)
23
(90)
19
(16)
4
Recreational
23 (50)
19 (90)
4 (16)
Air quality
30 (65)
19 (90)
11 (44)
Water quality/water
33 (72)
(90)
19
(21)
14
Historical
24 (52)
(90)
19
(20)
5
Architectural
24 (52)
19 (90)
5 (20)
Archeological
2 (4)
2 (10)
0 (0)
Paleontogical
(48)
22
(86)
18
(16)
4
Cultural
2 (4)
0 (0)
2 (8)
Conservation of land
28 (61)
18 (86)
10 (40)
Protecting natural resources
* As of October 1, 1998, the following states did not have easement enabling statutes:
Oklahoma, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming. The Uniform Conservation
Easement Act (UCEA) was adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 1981.

C. Tax Incentives for Donating Conservation Easements
Federal and state tax incentives have almost certainly
61
contributed to the growth in conservation easements in recent years.
The amount of taxes deductible from conservation easement donations

59. Squires, supra note 49, at 69, 72-73. The dates presented by Squires conflict with
those presented in other sources. See Antony W. Dnes & Dean Lueck, Common Law,
Statute Law and the Conservation Easement (draft 2003).
60. Mayo, supra note 52, at 26, 27-30.
61. See Stephen J. Small, An Obscure Tax Code Provision Takes Private Land Protection in
the Twenty-First Century, in PROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST,
PRESENT AND FUTURE 55-66 (Julie Ann Gustanski & Roderick H. Squires eds., 2000).
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depends (at least in part) on the appraised value of the easement. 62
Although several alternatives exist, 63 the most common appraisal
method is to value conservation easements as the difference between the
land's unencumbered value and its encumbered value. 64 Consider, for
example, a conservation easement that allows only one residence on a
parcel that would otherwise be developed and sold as ten separate
housing lots. If the value of the ten housing lots equals $2 million in
aggregate and the encumbered residence is worth $500,000, then the
conservation easement would be valued at $1.5 million. Of course, this
example assumes the appraisal is conducted without error, which may
not happen in practice.65
Federal recognition of the deductibility of conservation easement
donations officially began in 1976 with the passage of the Tax Reform
Act. 66 The legislation codified the deductibility of historic preservation
and conservation easements from federal income taxes.67 This initial
statute required a 30-year easement duration to be eligible and included
a "sunset" provision, which meant that, absent legislative action, the
deductibility of easements would be eliminated in 1981. 68 In 1977, the
1976 Act was amended to require that eligible easements be donated in
perpetuity. 69 Finally, in 1980, Congress permanently eliminated the
.sunset" provision and specified that easements must meet
certain
conservation purposes to be eligible for tax deductions. 70 The present
regulatory requirements are as follows:

62. See BICK & HANEY, supra note 40, at 38-39.
63. See James H. Boykins, Valuing Scenic Land Conservation Easements, 68 APPRAISAL J.
420,422-26 (2000).
64. See DIEHL & BARRETT, supra note 40, at 8; BICK & HANEY, supra note 40, at 38-39.
65. There may also be conceptual problems with this appraisal methodology. See
Abebayehu Tegene et al., Irreversible Investment Under Uncertainty: Conservation Easements
and the Option to Develop Agricultural Land, 50 J. AGRIc. ECON. 203, 215-17 (1999) (arguing
that conventional appraisals exaggerate potential urban returns and ignore the option
value of waiting to decide whether to develop or grant an easement).
66. Small, supra note 61, at 56.
67. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2124(e), 90 Stat. 1520, 1919-20 (1976).
The Act gives a landowner two options. An annual federal income tax deduction can be
claimed for up to 30 percent of adjusted gross income if the "fair market value" of the land
is used to compute the easement value. Alternatively, if the landowner elects to use the
property's basis (the value of the property when it was acquired) instead of the "fair
market value," an annual income tax deduction can be claimed for up to 50 percent of
adjusted gross income. In either case, if any excess value remains, it can be carried over for
up to six years. Id.
68. Small, supranote 61, at 56.
69. Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-30, § 309, 91 Stat. 126,
154 (1977).
70. Small, supra note 61, at 57.
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i) the preservation of land areas for outdoor recreation by,
or the education of, the general public or;
ii) the protection of a relatively natural habitat of fish,
wildlife, or plants, or similar ecosystems or;
iii) the preservation of open space (including farmland and
forest land) where such preservation is:
a) for the scenic enjoyment of the general public; or
b) pursuant to a clearly delineated federal, state, or
local governmental conservation policy, and will yield a
significant public benefit; or
iv) the preservation of an historically important land area or
a certified historic structure. 71
An additional tax incentive was introduced when President
Clinton signed the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. Congress allowed
reduction of federal estate taxes if the taxpayer had donated (or sold) an
easement that qualified for an income tax deduction under section
170(h). 72 In addition to meeting the eligibility criteria under section
170(h), the 1997 Act required that property under easement be either (1)
within 25 miles of an area defined by the federal Office of Management
and Budget as a metropolitan area, (2) within 25 miles of an area
designated as part of the National Wilderness Preservation System, or (3)
within ten miles of a U. S. Department of Agriculture Forest Service
designated Urban National Forest. 73 If these requirements were met, the
taxpayer was eligible to exempt up to 40 percent of the value of the
property encumbered by a conservation easement from the total
(unencumbered) estate value. 74 The amount that could be excluded,
however, was capped. 75 In 2001, Congress deleted the geographic
requirements for eligibility and provided an additional estate tax
exclusion of up to $500,000.76
In addition to federal tax incentives, many individual states
provide incentives for donating conservation easements. Because a
conservation easement lowers property values, landowners may realize
property tax reductions after encumbering their land. The actual amount

71. IRS, 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(d) (2004).
72. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.105-34, § 508, 111 Stat. 788, 857-60 (1997).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. The maximum amount excludable from an estate was $100,000 in 1998, increasing
by $100,000 each year until reaching the total allowable exclusion of $500,000 in 2002.
Small, supra note 61, at 61.
76. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, §
551, 115 Stat. 38, 86 (2001).
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of the reduction depends on state laws and "personal attitudes of local
officials and assessors."77 Seventeen states, however, have statutes that
require that local assessors reduce property value assessments when a
conservation easement encumbers land. 78 About ten states offer income
tax credits for donated easements. 79 With the exception of North
80
Carolina, these tax credit programs were all initiated after 1998.
III. LAND TRUST DECISIONS AND ECONOMIC THEORIES OF
OWNERSHIP
Having described land trusts, conservation easements, and tax
benefits, this section introduces the transaction cost and specialization
tradeoffs that conserving land with full ownership or conservation
easements generate. To help illustrate these sometimes subtle tradeoffs,
the issues are introduced using an analytical framework that extends
from economic models of the firm. 81 Land trusts are analogized to
producers that acquire inputs (land) from suppliers (landowners). With
these inputs, the trust produces outputs (environmental amenities) for its
customers (land trust beneficiaries).
Whether engaged in amenity preservation or enhancement, land
is the key input in the production process. 82 But thinking of land as an
input is far too general to have much analytical utility. Because
environmental amenities can be produced without full ownership of
77.

DIEHL & BARRETT, supra note 40, at 9.

78.

See DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE,

STATE GOVERNMENT

INcENTIVES FOR HABITAT

CONSERVATION: A STATUS REPORT (2002), at http://www.biodiversitypartners.org/pubs/
CinAReport/Resultsl.shtml#tax (last visited July 30, 2004).
79. Id. In Colorado, for example, landowners are entitled to a tax credit equal to the full
value of the donation up to $260,000. Each dollar of donation creates one dollar of tax
credit. See COLO. DEPT. OF REVENUE, GROSS CONSERVATION EASMENT CREDIT, at http://
www.revenue.state.co.us/fyi/html/income39.html (last visited July 30, 2004).
80. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, supra note 78. For a numerical example of the extent of the
tax benefits combined, see Dominic P. Parker & Walter N. Thurman, The Privateand Public
Economics of Land Trusts, NC STATE ECONOMIST, July/Aug. 2004, at 1, 3, available at
http://www.ag-econ.ncsu.edu/VIRTUALLIBRARY/ECONOMIST/julyaugO4.pdf
(last
visited Aug. 31, 2004).
81. The firm is an entity that seeks to maximize its profits in traditional economic
models. It does so by choosing how much output to produce, given the cost of its inputs
(e.g., land, labor, and capital) and the value of its output to consumers. Such models can be
found in virtually any microecononics textbook. See, e.g., DAVID D. FREIDMAN, PRIcE
THEORY: AN INTERMEDIATE TExT 200-46 (2d ed. 1990); JACK HIRSHLEIFER & DAVID
HIRSHLEIFER, PRIcE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 159-89 (6th ed. 1998).

82. Enhancement of environmental amenities is the more typical production process
because it involves active employment of inputs such as land, labor, and seed. Although
less intuitive, preservation is also like a production process because it involves passive
employment of land, which has an opportunity cost of use in another capacity.
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land, the key inputs are actually specific rights to land.8 3 Viewed in this
context, a land trust might produce open space or recreational trails, for
example, by acquiring development or public access rights to several
adjacent tracts of land.
A. Transaction Costs, Specialization, and the Organization of Firms
With this framework in place, analysis of why land trusts choose
ownership or easements can be informed by transaction-cost theories of
firm organization. These theories posit that businesses are more likely to
own, or "vertically integrate," inputs as the transaction costs of
depending on external suppliers increase. 84 Transaction costs increase
when any party to a contract or lease needs to exert more time, effort, or
money to specify, monitor, and enforce the terms of the arrangement. 85
Transaction costs borne by the supplier are directly reflected in increased
supply prices. Those borne by the firm implicitly raise the price of
external supplies. Hence, when transaction costs are sufficiently high,
profit-maximizing firms are more apt to fully own productive inputs.
As a simple example, consider the observed patterns of input
ownership among agricultural firms. Farmers are more likely to own,
rather than lease, harvesting equipment in areas where harvesting
seasons are highly variable. This choice reduces transaction costs because
uncertainties over harvest time raise the costs of specifying and
enforcing mutually acceptable leasing terms. 86 Similarly, farmers are also

83. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1, 44 (1960) ("We may
speak of a person owning land and using it as a factor of production but what the landowner in fact possesses is the right to carry out a circumscribed list of actions.").
84. The reverse is also true-businesses are more likely to contract for inputs if the
transaction costs of doing so are low. See generally Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4
ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration,Appropriable Rents, and the
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: FIRMis, MARKIrs & POUCY CONTROL 85-100 (1986); Sanford

Grossman & Oliver Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral
Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the
Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119 (1990); HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF
ENTERPRISE 24-49 (1996); YORAM BARzEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 3-84

(1997).
85. More precisely, transaction costs are "the resources used to establish and maintain
property rights. They include the resources used to protect and capture property rights,
plus any deadweight costs that result from any potential or real protecting and capturing."
See Douglas W. Allen, What Are Transaction Costs?, in 14 RESOURCE LAW AND ECONOMICS 1,
3 (Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr. & Victor P. Goldberg eds., 1991).
86. See Douglas W. Allen & Dean Lueck, Ownership Versus Contractingfor the Control of
Assets, in THE NATURE OF THE FARM:
AGRICULTURE 139, 147-48, 156-58 (2003).
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more likely to own land used for fruit orchards, nut farms, and
vineyards. This choice avoids the potentially high transaction costs of
specifying and enforcing leases that call for the diligent pruning that is
87
necessary for sustaining high quality harvests of these crops.
Despite higher transaction costs, however, leasing or contracting
for inputs can sometimes increase profits. This is because divided
ownership better facilitates gains from specialization. For example,
owners of farmland who lack farming experience are more likely to lease
their land to an experienced farmer than farm it themselves. 88 When
farming rights are leased to a more capable farmer, the land produces
more crops for a given level of farmer effort. Leasing provides a net gain
to the landowner as long as the experienced farmer charges less for his
time than the value of the landowner's effort in a non-farming capacity.
However, in choosing whether to lease his land, the inexperienced
farmer must weigh these potential gains from specialization against the
89
costs of specifying, monitoring, and enforcing the lease.
B. Transaction Costs, Specialization, and the Organization of Land
Trusts
This tradeoff in the context of land trust conservation is straightforward. Land trusts are not often staffed with an abundance of
experienced farmers, ranchers, or loggers. 90 Because a separate
landowner generally has a comparative advantage in producing crops,
beef, and timber, conserving these lands with conservation easements
will probably facilitate more economical production of non-conservation
output.91 But easements divide ownership, and prohibited land uses will
87. Id. at 151-54.
88. Id. at 154-55.
89. Id. at 146-50. See also BARZEL, supra note 84, at 33-64 (hypothesizing that
specialization and transaction cost tradeoffs determine if and how asset ownership is
divided).
90. Most land trusts are small organizations with limited resources. In 1998, the
median budget for a sample of 654 state and local land trusts was only $18,490. For a
slightly smaller sample of land trusts reporting staffing information, the median number of
full-time employees was two and the median number of part-time employees was one-anda-half. 1998 NATIONAL DIREcTORY, supra note 3.
91. See, e.g., James Boyd et al., The Law and Economics of Habitat Conservation: Lessons
from an Analysis of Easement Acquisitions, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 209, 214 (2000) ("conservators
who are not farmers may be less able to maximize the financial value of conservationcompatible land uses.....). See also BRENDA LIND, WORKING RANCHLAND CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS 13 (2002) (quoting conservation consultant Story Clark: "Ranchers know more
about management for agricultural purposes than land trusts do."). Of course, land trusts
can own land outright and lease rights back to farmers, ranchers, or loggers. This strategy
also entails transaction costs. See infra Part IV and text accompanying notes 115-117.
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be costly to monitor and enforce. 92 Furthermore, in spite of timeconsuming efforts to specify provisions, some land uses will not be
clearly permitted or prohibited. 93 Ambiguous delineation of land rights
creates incentives for both parties to try to capture the value of the
unclaimed property interests, thereby reducing the net value of the land
under divided ownership. 94
For example, if timber prices rise, the landowner has an
incentive to exploit ambiguous descriptions of streamside buffer zones in
the easement by claiming a right to harvest more timber. Or, if the
number of land trust donors with recreational interests swells, the trust
has an incentive to exploit ambiguous restrictions concerning public
access by claiming a right to allow more liberal access. To be sure,
attorneys can draft conservation easements that mitigate such
ambiguity. 95 Even so, obtaining this assurance can be time-consuming.
Furthermore, some land uses that are explicitly prohibited in
conservation easements are still costly to monitor and enforce. 96 In
certain instances, therefore, the land trusts' only reliable way of avoiding
97
potentially high transaction costs is to own land outright.
Insofar as land trusts try to reduce the long-run costs of
providing environmental amenities, we should therefore observe
conservation easements when expected transaction costs are low or
when expected gains from specialization are high. For example, we
might expect land trusts to hold easements over productive farmland
92. See Boyd et al., supra note 91, at 215 (recognizing that "it may be difficult to monitor
and enforce the terms of an easement contract"). See also Keith Weibe et al., Managing Public
and Private Land Through PartialInterests, 15 CONTEMP. ECON. POL. 35, 42 (1997) (explaining
that negotiation, monitoring, and enforcement costs are higher for conservation easements
than for full interest acquisitions).
93. A conservation easement is like a relational contract that governs an ongoing
relationship between a land trust and a series of landowners. See Boyd et al., supra note 91,
at 219-33. Relational contracts are invariably incomplete, either because they fail to express
provisions for all contingencies or because they stipulate future states too rigidly. See Alan
Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial
Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 278-81 (1992).
94. See generally BARZEL, supra note 84, at 3-6.
95. See Andrew C. Dana, The Silent Partner in Conservation Easements: Draftingfor the
Courts, 8 THE BACKFORTY: THE NwsL. OF LAND CONSERVATION L. (Hastings College of
Law), Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 7-8.
96. Because land trusts can only periodically monitor easements, establishing causeand-effect relationships between landowner actions and changes in the landscape may be
difficult. See Boyd et al., supra note 91, at 215 ("For example, failure to uphold conservation
terms may be difficult to discern if natural changes in land cover are indistinguishable from
changes induced by poor management or a change in a farming technique.").
97. See, e.g., Dana, supra note 95, at 12 ("[P]roperties that need intensive management
to provide significant public values are probably better candidates for acquisition in fee
than for conservation easements.").
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when the conservation value lies mostly in bucolic scenery. A trust can
preserve scenic views simply by prohibiting conspicuous construction.
Specifying, monitoring, and enforcing such terms in conservation
easements should not be difficult.
If transaction cost theory applies to land trusts, however, they
must be motivated to reduce costs in an environment strikingly different
than that of profit-seeking firms. Unlike most firms, land trusts do not
bear the full costs of providing environmental amenities because their
acquisitions are usually financed in part through the tax code.98 And
land trusts probably do not receive financial rewards that, in the case of
profit-seeking firms, are highly correlated with maximizing the
difference between long-run benefits and costs.99 For these reasons, land
trusts may have weak incentives to carefully weigh the tradeoffs of
landowner specialization and transaction costs when deciding how to
conserve land. 1°°
At the same time, forces different from those that work on firms
may prompt land trusts to consider how the factors affect long-run costs.
The success of the private land conservation movement ultimately
depends on its ability to make cost-effective decisions. Knowing this,
land trusts employ self-regulation devices and disseminate information
that guides and coordinates their efforts as a group. For example, the
umbrella organization Land Trust Alliance differentiates land trusts that
have complied with its Standards and Practices policies. 10 1 The Land

98. See supra Part II and accompanying notes 61-80.
99. See, e.g., Henry B.Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838
(1980) ("A nonprofit organization is, in essence, an organization that is barred from
distributing its net earnings, if any, to individuals who exercise control over it, such as
members, officers, directors, or trustees.").
100. To be sure, land trusts have strong incentives to consider these factors when their
beneficiaries penalize imprudent conservation decisions. Land trust beneficiaries, however,
are ill-defined and sometimes lack the information and incentives needed to vigilantly
monitor land trusts and carefully critique their conservation decisions. In academic jargon,
slack between the land trust (agent) and its beneficiaries (principals) is sometimes loose. As
a consequence, land trusts will not be held accountable for every decision they make. See
generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (describing the principalagent problem in a for-profit business context).
101.

LAND TRusT ALLIANCE, THE STANDARDS AND PRACTICEs GUIDEBOOK (1997); see also

LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, FIND A LAND TRUST NEAR You, at http://www.lta.org/find
landtrust/index.html (last visited July 30, 2004) (noting that "S&P" next to a land trust's
listing "indicates adoption of LTA's Standards & Practices, guidelines for responsible and
ethical operation of a land trust").
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Trust Alliance also provides various publications and conferences that
102
teach members easement drafting and stewardship techniques.
The section that follows assumes that self-regulation and
training succeed so that land trusts are motivated to reduce the costs of
providing a given amenity. This assumption allows me to apply
transaction cost theory to generate predictions of different portfolios of
full interest land and conservation easements among land trusts. The
data discussed in section V imply that this assumption about land trust
motives is reasonable.
IV. THE ECONOMIC TRADEOFFS OF EASEMENTS AND FULL
OWNERSHIP 103
Building from transaction cost theories of firm ownership, this
section more precisely analyzes the economic tradeoffs generated when
land trusts conserve land with full ownership or conservation
easements. 1°4 The analytical framework focuses on economic tradeoffs
resulting from changes in the transaction costs of holding conservation
easements and from changes in the benefits to be accrued from land trust
and landowner specialization.105 It is worth emphasizing that the
framework does not attempt to explain why a land trust is the vehicle for
providing open space, wildlife habitat, or any other environmental
amenity on private land. 1°6 Although this question is worthy of analysis,
it is peripheral to this article's focus on the economic tradeoffs of
conserving land with full ownership or conservation easements.

102.

See

LAND

TRUsT

ALLIANCE,

THE

CONSERVATION

EASEMENT

LIBRARY,

at

http://www.lta.org/publications/easement__ib.htm (last visited July 30, 2004); See also
LAND

TRUST

ALLIANCE,

TRAINING

AND

CONFERENCES,

at

http://www.lta.org/

training/ index.html (last visited July 30, 2004).
103. A formal economic model is presented in Dominic P. Parker, Easements or
Ownership? Transaction Costs and the Economics of Land Trust Conservation, 8-18 (2004)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
104. The framework most closely follows the logic of BARZEL, supranote 84, at 3-55.
105. The role of tax benefits in affecting conservation methods is discussed later in this
article. See discussion infra Part VI.
106. The framework does suggest that land trusts have a comparative advantage over
landowners in assembling and coordinating the necessary inputs. For an analysis of why
the number of land trusts has surged in some regions but not in others, see Sean
Mulholland, Land Trusts: The Growth of the Non-Profit Land Conservancy Movement, in
INCENTIVES AND CONSERVATION: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTALISTS (Daniel K.

Benjamin ed., in press) (arguing that increasing distrust of government action and new
institutional technologies, e.g., the conservation easement, have spurred the growth of land
trusts).
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A. Land Trusts as Producers of Environmental Amenities
To begin, assume that a land trust wishes to preserve or enhance
environmental amenities (E) on a given landscape.1 07 Examples of E
include scenic views, wildlife habitat, and recreational trails. In order to
produce E, the land trust must acquire and control some of the rights
related to the tract of land and dedicate them to amenity production.
Rights used to produce E may be negative, such as the right to restrict
development or regulate farming practices, or positive, such as the right
to plant vegetation or construct trails. In either case, rights employed in
the production of E are considered conservation rights.
The remaining non-conservation rights are residual rights and
can be used to produce non-conservation output (Y). Non-conservation
rights may be positive, such as the right to graze livestock, or negative,
such as the right to restrict recreational access. As residual rights, the
non-conservation rights are inversely related to conservation rights. That
is, a negative conservation right is a positive non-conservation right and a
positive conservation right is a negative non-conservation right. For
example, if a land trust acquires (negative) rights to restrict grazing
seasons and Animal Unit Months, there is a corresponding decrease in
the right to graze animals, which is a positive non-conservation right
associated with the parcel. If the land trust acquires (positive) rights to
allow public access, there is a corresponding decrease in the right to
prohibit public access, which is a negative non-conservation right
associated with the parcel.
The total value of land used to produce environmental amenities
is positively correlated with the expected value of E plus the expected
value of Y. For example, if the tract of land is used to produce corn and
to provide public access, the aggregate value of the land is positively
related to expected demand for corn and outdoor recreation. Net values
depend on the expected costs of producing E (deer) and Y (corn). The
opportunity cost of employing conservation rights depends on the
107. The land trust wants to preserve or enhance E on a parcel of land either because of
exogenous increases in the demand for amenities or exogenous decreases in the costs of
providing them. On the demand side, an increase in the number of recreation enthusiasts,
for example, might spur a land trust to expand a hiking trail. On the cost side, increases in
the number of volunteers available for trail maintenance might spur a land trust to expand
a hiking trail (because labor costs are lowered). These factors can be considered exogenous
because they are mostly determined by external factors outside of any particular land
trust's control. This is a simplifying assumption, of course, because an entrepreneurial land
trust can lower the costs of providing amenities with innovative strategies. For a discussion
of such strategies, see Terry L. Anderson, Viewing Land Conservation through Coase-Colored
Glasses,44 NAT. REsouRcES J. 361 (2004).
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expected value of Y. For example, the opportunity cost of restricting a
development project depends on its expected value. Conversely, the
opportunity cost of employing non-conservation rights depends on the
expected value of E. For example, the opportunity cost of developing a
wooded parcel depends on the expected value of lost wildlife habitat.
Other relevant costs include those incurred to employ nonconservation and conservation labor. Non-conservation labor inputs are
combined with positive non-conservation rights in the production of Y
(e.g., farming for corn). A land trust that wants to enhance, rather than
preserve E, will need to acquire positive conservation rights and employ
conservation labor (e.g., for ecological restoration or trail maintenance).
Within this traditional production setup, the expected net value
of the land is maximized by dedicating the optimal combination of rights
towards conservation and employing the optimal units of conservation
and non-conservation labor. Given mathematical assumptions about the
relationship between input employment and expected values and costs,
this model could predict changes in input use with respect to changes in
expected values and costs. It is worth emphasizing, however, that the
production setup tells us little about factors that would motivate
conservation easements or full interest.1°8 Under the assumption of zero
transaction costs, as the Coase Theorem implies, 1°9 input use is
optimized regardless of whether land trusts control land use with full
ownership or with a conservation easement. In other words, land will
provide the same combination of amenities and non-conservation
output, at the same cost, under either regime.
B. Transaction Costs under a Conservation Easement or Full
Ownership Regime
Of course, transaction costs are not zero and they depend on the
regime that is used to control land. Under a conservation easement

108. See Yoram Barzel, Property Rights in the Firm, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION,
CONFLICT, AND LAW 43, 44-46 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds., 2003)
(discussing how neoclassical models of the firm are not informative with respect to
predicting how a firm will control its inputs).
109. As noted by Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, "The theorem is suggested, but not
explicitly stated, in the classic article by Professor Coase." Here, I apply one of Cooter and
Ulen's interpretations of the theorem, namely that "[t]he initial assignment of property
rights does not matter when transaction costs are zero." ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN,
LAW & ECONONCS 101 (1988). Put in the context above, this means that when transaction
costs are zero, the same amount of E and Y will be produced regardless of whether land
trusts use easements or ownership.
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regime, the land trust acts as the residual claimant to E,1 0 and a separate
landowner is the residual claimant to Y. Divided ownership creates
incentives for the landowner or land trust to try to capture the value of
the other party's residual claim, as described earlier."' As a result, each
party incurs costs to specify, monitor, and enforce their property
2
rights."
Two categories of transaction costs are relevant. The first is the
cost of specifying, monitoring, and enforcing claims to negative
conservation rights. For example, if the negative conservation right is
one that regulates residential structures, transaction costs include efforts
to define permissible quantities, sizes, and locations and to monitor and
enforce compliance. The second is the cost of specifying, monitoring, and
enforcing claims to positive conservation rights. For example, if the
positive right allows the land trust access to plant or remove vegetation,
transaction costs include the efforts to define appropriate access
methods, times, and numbers and to monitor and enforce compliance.
Notice that under a conservation easement regime the land trust will
always incur transaction costs. When the land trust acquires positive
conservation rights, however, the landowner also incurs transaction
costs associated with asserting her claim to the related residual rights.
Land trust full ownership effectively eliminates these transaction
costs. 113 Under this regime, the land trust acts as the residual claimant to
both E and Y. It has incentives to use the land in such a way that
minimizes the costs of providing environmental amenities. For example,
it will not seek to graze cattle in a way that threatens stream banks if it
wishes to preserve water quality. It will graze cattle, however, to the
extent that water quality is not threatened. Not doing so would be at the
opportunity cost of preserving water quality elsewhere.

110. Land trust beneficiaries are technically the residual claimants to E. The land trust,
however, will act like the residual claimant to E if it is either monitored scrupulously by its
beneficiaries or its employees receive utility positively correlated with the quality and
quantity of environmental amenities it provides.
111. See supratext accompanying notes 92-97.
112. See, e.g., BARZEL, supranote 84, at 3-6.
113. The assumption here is that the land trust does not own the land outright and lease
farming, grazing, or logging rights to a third party. Such an arrangement would
temporarily divide residual claims to E and Y and create incentives similar to those created
by a conservation easement.
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C. Specialization under a Conservation Easement or Full Ownership
Regime
Although full ownership eliminates these transaction costs,
conservation easements offer specialization benefits that may offset their
higher transaction costs. Those benefits help explain why conservation
easements are prevalent in practice.
Relative to a land trust, a landowner has a comparative
advantage in converting positive non-conservation rights into nonconservation outputs (Y). For example, farmers can produce crops at a
lower cost than can most land trusts. Under a fee-simple ownership
regime, the land trust can use its own labor to generate Y or it can
contract with a specialist (e.g., farmer or rancher). If the land trust uses its
own labor, it will forego gains from specialization. But if the trust
contracts with a specialist, it will have to monitor his or her performance
and search for the appropriate rental price. Either scenario implies that
the marginal cost of a comparable unit of non-conservation labor is likely
to be higher under a land trust ownership regime than it is under a
conservation easement regime.
In contrast, relative to a landowner, a land trust generally has a
comparative advantage in converting positive conservation rights into
conservation outputs (E).114 Under a conservation easement regime,
amenity enhancement can be conducted with land trust or landowner
labor. If the landowner conducts the labor, gains from specialization
generally will be forfeited. If the land trust conducts the labor, the
landowner will incur the transaction costs discussed above.
D. Transaction Cost and Specialization Tradeoffs
Table 3 shows the economic tradeoffs of easements versus land
trust full interest ownership. The basic tradeoff involved with the
preservation of environmental amenities (E) with easements is one of
weighing the potential for high land trust transaction costs against the
potential benefits derived from landowner specialization. If land trusts
are motivated to reduce the costs of preservation, they will be more
likely to preserve E with conservation easements when expected
transaction costs are low or when potential gains from landowner
specialization are high.
114. Land trusts are more likely to have access to ecologists and other environmental
scientists as well as volunteer labor. In addition, land trusts are probably better suited to
coordinate restoration and other active management activities among distinct landholdings.
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In contrast to mere preservation, tradeoffs involved with the
enhancement of amenities are more complicated. Potential gains from
landowner specialization under an easement regime must be weighed
against the potential for high transaction costs incurred by both the land
trust and the landowner. In general then, transaction cost theory predicts
that land trusts should be less likely to enhance E with conservation
easements than they are to preserve E. Easements may be justified,
however, if potential gains from landowner specialization are
sufficiently high to outweigh the potentially high transaction costs.
TABLE 3: TRANSACTION COST AND SPECIALIZATION TRADEOFFS
Enhancement of E

Preservation of E

Yes

Full
Interest
No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Full
Interest
No

No

Easement
Potential for high land trust
transaction costs
Potential for high landowner
transaction costs
Potential gains from landowner
labor specialization
Potential gains from land trust
I
labor specialization

Easement

I-_I

It should be emphasized that the tradeoffs in Table 3 are
unequivocal only when the land trust does not own the land outright
and leases farming, grazing, or logging rights to a third party. Such an
arrangement would temporarily divide residual claims to E and Y,
allowing specialized non-conservation labor at the expense of efforts to
monitor the terms of the lease and search for appropriate rental prices.
Whether the transaction costs of owning and leasing are greater than the
transaction costs of holding conservation easements will depend on
specific characteristics of the land, landowner, and land trust, as well as
the legal enforceability of easements.
In general, the transaction costs of easements should be lower
than those related to owning and leasing when the land trust is simply
engaged in amenity preservation. Conservation easements do not
require multiple negotiations (as leases expire), nor do they require
vigilance in monitoring a tenants' treatment of soil and other productive
attributes of the land. 115 In contrast, enhancing amenities with
conservation easements may tend to generate higher transaction costs
than land trust ownership and leasing. Amenity enhancement calls for
115. Agriculture tenants, especially ones with short-term leases, have incentives to
increase current yields at the expense of future yields. See generally ALLEN & LUECK, supra
note 86.
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"adaptive management"-a process of experimenting with, and
monitoring the outcome of, different natural resource management techniques. 116 Land trust ownership with leasing arrangements should be
more amenable to adaptive management, particularly because
11 7
conservation easements are difficult to amend.
V. OBSERVED BEHAVIOR: ANALYSIS OF LAND TRUST
ACREAGE"8

Two types of data sets help assess whether land trust ownership
patterns respond to the tradeoffs illustrated in Table 3. The first, a timeseries data set, is used to examine whether increases in the prevalence of
conservotion easements over time is explained by decreases in the
transaction costs land trusts face when holding them. The second, a
cross-section data set, is used to examine whether differences in
transaction costs and specialization benefits related to holding easements
explain differences in the conservation methods used by individual land
trusts at a snapshot in time. For both types of analysis, Land Trust
Alliance surveys of state and local land trusts throughout the United
States provide the primary data source. 119 Time series analysis uses data
from surveys conducted in 1984, 1990, 1997, and 2000.120 Cross-section
analysis employs data from only the 1997 survey. 121

116. See generally George Wilhere, Adaptive Management in HabitatConservation Plans, 16
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 20, 21 ("[A]daptive management can be defined as the systematic
acquisition and application of reliable information to improve natural resource management over time."). For a discussion of management contracts conducive to adaptive
management, see Christopher S. Elmendorf, Securing Ecological Investments on Other People's
Land: A Transaction-CostsPerspective,44 NAT. REsOuRcEsJ. 529 (2004).
117. The Land Trust Alliance cautions land trusts against agreeing to amendments and
the IRS tax code disallows amendments that decrease the value of the original donation
(providing a tax deduction was taken). See, e.g., DIEHL & BARRETr, supra note 40, at 121-25.
118. For a more complete discussion of the data and empirical analysis summarized
here, see Parker, supra note 103, at 18-31.
119. The surveys attempted to identify the name and mailing address of every land
trust operating in the United States. Furthermore, the surveys attempted to quantify the
number of acres "protected" by each land trust.
120. Results from the 1984 survey were published in 1985, LAND TRUST EXCHANGE,
supra note 21; from the 1990 survey in 1991, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, 1991-92 NATIONAL
DIRECTORY OF CONSERVATION LAND TRuSTS (1991); from the 1997 survey in 1998, 1998
NATIONAL DIRECTORY, supra note 3; and from the 2000 survey in 2000. In lieu of printing
and distributing copies of the 2000 survey results, the LTA has made these data available
only through customized responses to specific queries from member organizations.
However, extensive summary data are available online. See SUMMARY DATA, supranote 17.
121. The 1997 survey is used instead of the 2000 survey because data from the 1997
survey can be matched with other relevant data. For example, the cross-section analysis
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A. Land Trust Responses to Changes in Transaction Costs Over Time
Table 1 shows that conservation easement growth outstripped
full interest acquisition growth from 1990 to 2000. In 1990, 52 percent of
state, local, and regional land trust acreage was held in conservation
easements compared with 68 percent in 2000. Across states, the median
percentage of acreage held in easements nearly tripled, increasing from
22 percent in 1990 to 61 percent in 2000. These statistics show that the
trend towards greater reliance on easements was broadly distributed
across states. The trend was driven by mature land trusts - those formed
prior to 1990. Roughly 50 percent of the acres held by land trusts
established after 1990 were in easements. In comparison, roughly 80
percent of the acres acquired (between 1990 and 2000) by land trusts
22
formed prior to 1990 were in easements (figures not shown in Table 1).1
Although also not shown in Table 1, the 1990 to 2000 increase in
the percentage of acres held in easements was calculated for each state.
The increase for Colorado, for example, was 31 because 98 percent of
land trust acres in the state were in easements in 2000 compared with 67
percent in 1990. This statistic was positive for 38 states, negative for 12
states, and the mean was 21 for all states. 123 It is interesting to note that
the mean increase was 34 for the 8 states that adopted easement-enabling
statutes after 1990 compared to 20 for the 40 states adopting statutes
prior to 1990.124 The mean increase was 34 for the 29 states that adopted
statutes after 1985 compared with 14 percent for those that adopted
statutes prior to 1985.
The findings above build some preliminary support for the
transaction cost theory. General trends toward more reliance on
conservation easements may be explained by declining transaction costs.
Better legal technologies and more sophisticated coordination among
employs county-level, U.S. Census of Agriculture data, which were gathered by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture in 1997, but not in 2000. See infra note 130.
122. Slightly different calculations reveal similar results. For the 198 land trusts that
held acres in 1985 as well as 1998, the percentage of their acreage in easements increased
from 48 percent in 1985 to 73 percent in 1998. The 1998 percentage of acreage held in
easements by land trusts formed after 1985 was 53 percent. These calculations employ data
from LAND TRUST EXCHANGE, supra note 21; 1998 NATIONAL DIRECTORY, supra note 3; and

are on file with the author.
123. These calculations employ summary data from the LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, 1991-92
NATIONAL DIRECTORY OF CONSERVATION LAND TRUSTS and the LAND TRUST ALLIANCE,

2000 NATIONAL LAND TRUST CENSUS, at http://www.lta.org/newsroom/census
summary-data.htm (last visited Aug. 2, 2004), and the calculations are on file with the
author.
124. These calculations, which are on file with the author, use easement-enabling statute
data from Squires, supra note 49, at 72-73.
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land trusts mean that easements are now less costly to draft, monitor,
and enforce. This notion is evidenced -albeit crudely-by the fact that
existing land trusts have driven the shift toward more reliance on
easements. Assuming that their primary missions remained intact, these
land trusts appear to have shifted the means for achieving their goals as
the transaction costs of doing so declined. In addition, the finding that
land trust reliance on easements increased most rapidly in states that had
recently adopted a statute is consistent with the notion that easementenabling statutes increase the likelihood that courts will enforce
conservation easements, thereby triggering an influx of easement
acquisitions relative to fee-simple. 125
B. Individual Land Trust Responses to Transaction Costs and
Specialization
The next question is whether differences in transaction costs and
specialization benefits explain why individual land trusts, operating in
different locations at a given moment in time, hold more of their acres in
conservation easements or full ownership. The snap-shot-in-time, crosssection data set is comprised of about 760 land trusts that were
established prior to 1999.126 All land trusts in the sample hold land in
conservation easements, fee-simple, or both. Sample land trusts operate
in a region defined either by an entire state, multiple counties within a
state, a single county, or a city contained in a county. 127
1. Measures of TransactionCosts and SpecializationFaced by Different Land
Trusts
Variations in transaction costs and specialization benefits faced
by these land trusts is accounted for by differences in their conservation
goals and the characteristics of landholdings and legal statutes in their
area of operation. More precisely, variation among land trusts is
accounted for by differences in (1) the environmental amenities they
provide for beneficiaries; (2) whether they seek to enhance, rather than
simply preserve, amenities; (3) the average size of landholdings sought;
(4) easement-enabling statutes under which they operate; and (5) the
land's capacity to simultaneously produce non-conservation output.
125. This is essentially the argument presented by Dana & Ramsey, supra note 4, at 1721.
126. These data come from the 1998 NATIONAL DIRECTORY, supra note 3.
127. Land trusts operating in multiple states, such as the Rocky Mountain Elk
Foundation, The Nature Conservancy, and the Forest Trust, are excluded from the sample
because their land holdings are not governed by a single state law.
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Amenities Provided. In the 1998 National Directory of Conservation
Land Trusts, land trusts reported providing watersheds/water quality,
wetlands, river corridors, trails, greenways, parklands, community
gardens, scenic views, scenic roads, rare species habitat, historic and
128
cultural sites, and forests.
Enhancement of Amenities. Some of the land trusts engage in
"ecological restoration" or "management activities for rare and
endangered species." 129 These activities distinguish land trusts that
simply preserve amenities from those that enhance or create amenities.
Size of Landholdings in Area of Operation. The U.S. Department of
Agriculture's 1997 Census of Agriculture 130 contains information about
agricultural land holdings including estimates of the number of farms
and acres of farmland by county. This information is used to estimate the
average size of agricultural landholdings in the region in which each
land trust operates. This variable is a proxy for the average size of
private landholdings that a land trust might help conserve.
Easement Enabling Statutes. As noted in section II, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, North Dakota, and Wyoming did not have easement
enabling statutes as of 1998.131 Also noted in section II, easement statutes
were enacted in various years and vary in terms of which amenities they
explicitly allow conservation easements to protect.132 For purposes here,
land trusts are grouped by whether they operate under an easement
enabling statute. If they do, they are also grouped by whether they were
organized prior to the enactment of the state's original easementenabling statute and by whether their statute is a variant of the UCEA. 133
Land's Capacity for Jointly Producing Non-Conservation Output.
Some land trusts focus on protecting farmland, ranches, or timberland" 34
(working lands). Once the development value of land is suppressed,
working lands tend to have high non-conservation value relative to nonworking land.

128. The Directory lists "the primary land types protected by a land trust. A land trust
may protect additional types of land or resources [amenities] that are not listed in this
directory." 1998 NATIONAL DIRECTORY, supra note 3.

129.
130.
2003).
131.
132.
133.
134.
note 3.

Id.
The census is available at http://www.nass.usda.gov/census/ (last visited Aug. 2,
Squires, supranote 49, at 72-73.
Id; see also Mayo, supra note 52, at 28-30.
These groupings use data displayed by Squires, supranote 49, at 72-73.
Timberlands are logged while forests are not. See 1998 NATIONAL DIRECTORY, supra
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2. Empirical Tests and Results
Regression analysis estimated the percent of acreage that land
trusts controlled with conservation easements as a function of the above
factors. 135 Factors that increased the likelihood that a land trust would
hold more of its acreage in conservation easements were (1) the
provision of scenic views, (2) increases in the average size of agricultural
landholdings in the land trusts' area of operation, and (3) whether the
land was logged, farmed, or ranched. The factors that increased the
likelihood that a land trust would hold more of its acreage in fee-simple
were (1) providing recreational amenities, (2) enhancing amenities, and
(3) operating under a UCEA statute. The factors that had no effect on the
likelihood that a land trust would hold more of its acreage in easements
were (1) operating under an easement-enabling statute and (2) providing
watersheds/water quality, wetlands, rare species habitat, historic and
cultural sites, or forest amenities.
These results are generally consistent with the transaction cost
theory. Consider first the findings regarding amenities provided. The
amenities that are easiest to provide with conservation easements are
scenic views. The land trust simply needs to prohibit certain construction
and commercial use and periodically inspect the property to make sure
new structures that spoil the view have not been erected. However, the
transaction costs of using easements to provide forests, watersheds/water quality, wetlands, rare species habitat, and historic sites are
variable and depend on specific characteristics of the land. 136 In general,
then, the transaction costs of providing these amenities with easements
may be high or low. As predicted, land trusts prefer easements when
preserving environmental amenities entails low transactions costs.
Transaction cost theory also explains why land trusts would
prefer to provide recreational amenities with full interest ownership.
Doing so with conservation easements could generate high transaction
costs. Either the land trust or the landowner would need to construct and
maintain trails and related facilities and such building and maintenance
agreements would be costly to specify and monitor. In addition, the
parties would need to agree to a recreational plan that defined access
numbers, times, and methods. The plan would require monitoring to
assure compliance because the landowner would have incentives to

135. Readers interested in details should consult Parker, supra note 103, at 18-31.
136. Consider water quality as an example. On one hand, water quality in a rural area
may be improved by simply fencing cattle to prevent them from grazing next to a
watershed. On the other hand, ensuring water quality in an urban area may require the use
of costly measuring and monitoring devices.
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shirk on providing adequate access and the land trust would have
incentives to maximize recreational opportunities for its beneficiaries.
Furthermore, trails require connected parcels and their provision via
137
easements could be thwarted by one or two unwilling landowners.
Hence, land trusts that provide recreational amenities tend to prefer full
interest ownership because of its lower transactions costs.
Enhancing amenities presents similar issues. Like providing
recreational amenities, enhancing environmental amenities through
easements also requires management agreements with the landowner.
Forming such agreements requires the creation of standards, monitoring
to see if the standards have been achieved, and the modification of
management practices in response to new information. 38 These
transaction costs are likely to be high, especially as property ownership
changes, enhancing amenities requires spatial coordination of land use
over multiple parcels. Land trust ownership allows trusts to adaptively
manage resources without time consuming negotiations and relationship
building with landowners.
Transaction costs may also explain why easements are used
more often where agricultural holdings are large. Economies of scale
offered by large landholdings would lower the transaction costs per acre.
Monitoring multiple small parcels involves more time to measure the
condition of the separate properties, more time and travel expenses to
schedule and conduct periodic monitoring visits, and more time to build
relationships with landowners. Therefore, easements would be
preferable where trusts can acquire larger holdings.
Consider next the finding that land trusts preserving working
lands are more likely to hold a greater percentage of their acres in
easements. This finding is consistent with the idea that easements will be
used when there are large gains to be accrued from the specialization of
a landowner that is not the land trust. For any given level of effort, the
yield from farm or ranch land should be significantly higher when
generated by a specialized operator. Because there is no such yield from
non-agricultural land, there is less to be gained from divided ownership.
By relying primarily on conservation easements over working lands,
land trusts are exploiting economic benefits that arise from the
comparative advantage of specialization.
137. These arguments suggest that the costs of providing recreational access should rise
with increases in population pressures. Regression results indicate that this is the case.
Increases in population density increase the likelihood that land trusts will provide
recreational amenities with full ownership when controlling for other factors. See Parker,
supra note 103, at 25.
138. See, e.g., Wilhere, supra note 116, at 21-22.

Spring 2004]

CHOICES TO CONSERVE LAND

Two findings, however, are at odds with the transaction cost
theory: first, land trusts operating under a UCEA statute held less
acreage in easements relative to trusts operating under non-UCEA
statutes, and second, land trusts operating under an easement-enabling
statute do not hold more acres in easements than trusts without such a
statute. The UCEA result, however, is not completely unexpected
because many non-UCEA states have statutes and legal precedent that
139
In
rival UCEA statutes with regard to easement enforceability.
more
be
will
statutes
UCEA
lack
that
in
states
trusts
land
addition,
motivated to lobby for UCEA statutes only if the existing statute is weak.
The second finding is more surprising. It suggests that easement
enforcement is not markedly different in states that lack statutes. It may
be that the difficulties of enforcing easements under the common law
occur more in theory than in practice. The subject 14°of easement
enforceability and easement statutes merits more research.
VI. TAX INCENTIVES: THE OTHER DRIVER
Considered together, the data and empirical results imply that
land trusts hold full interest and easement acreage in such a way that
exploits gains from specialization and mitigates transaction costs. But tax
incentives are also an important driver. Over time and across locales,
variation in the tax benefits of donating fee-simple and easement acreage
should influence the supply of conservation easements and full land
interests offered to land trusts.
A. Changes in Tax Incentives Offered to Landowners over Time
It is difficult to determine how much of the trend toward greater
reliance on conservation easements is explained by federal tax
incentives. Time series data that quantify land trust easement and feesimple acreage before and after 1976 would better enable testing of the
effect of the federal income tax incentive. Unfortunately, such data are
not readily available. With available data, one might discern the effect of
federal tax incentives by carefully controlling for changes in the
139. This is especially the case in the predominantly non-UCEA Northeast. See
Marchetti & Cosgrove, supra note 58, at 78-101.
140. The statute-year data from Squires, supra note 49, at 72-73, may be inappropriate
for use in this context. See Antony W. Dnes & Dean Lueck, Common Law, Statute Law and
the Conservation Easement (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(suggesting that Squires does not distinguish between the year in which statutes were
created to enable public agencies from the year in which statutes were created or amended
to enable private holders).
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transaction costs of holding easements over time. Controlling for such
costs, however, is complicated. The most quantifiable transaction cost
reducing device-the easement-enabling statute-also increases the
141
likelihood that landowners can capitalize on federal tax incentives.
Despite this constraint on empirical analysis, common sense suggests
that federal income and estate tax incentives have helped to propel the
use of conservation easements since 1976.
B. Differences in Tax Incentives across States and Locales
Fewer impediments constrain empirical analysis of the effects of
tax incentives across states and locales. As discussed in section II,
seventeen states have statutes that require local assessors to reduce
property value assessments when a conservation easement encumbers
the land."42 Holding other relevant variables constant, regression analysis
shows that land trusts operating in these states hold a greater percentage
of their acreage in conservation easements.1 43 This finding implies that
property tax incentives encourage landowners to donate conservation
easements.'"
Because most farmers and ranchers already pay property taxes
based on current-use, property tax benefits probably do not motivate
donations of easements over agricultural land. 145 To discern whether this
is indeed the case, the sample of land trusts was divided between those
that acquire land interests on working lands and those that do not. In the
non-working lands sample, land trusts operating in states requiring that
tax appraisers take into account easement encumbrance held more of
their acreage in conservation easements than did trusts operating in
states without the requirement. 146 In the working lands sample, however,
statutes requiring that tax appraisals account for conservation easements
did not affect the percentage of acreage land trusts held in easements. 47
As expected, land trusts hold more easements if they operate in a state
141.

See e.g., Squires, supra note 49, at 70-71.

142.

DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, supra note 78.

143. For more details, see Parker supra note 103, at 18-31.
144. A myriad of other state-level tax incentives for donating conservation easements
(e.g., income, estate, real-estate transfer) exist and should also affect land trust ownership
decisions. However, these tax breaks are too disparate to quantify and categorize. See
DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, supranote 78.

145. Nearly every state assesses the property tax liability of agricultural land based on
value in its "current," not "full-market" use. For a clearinghouse of state statutes, see
AMERICAN

FARMLAND

TRUST,

STATE

FARMLAND

PROTECTION STATUTES,

http://www.farmlandinfo.org/farmland-preservationilaws/
146. For more details, see Parker supra note 103, at 29-30.
147. Id.

available at

(last visited Aug. 2, 2004).
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that requires property tax assessors to account for easements in valuing
property. However, such laws have less impact on agricultural land
because long-standing valuation methods protect such landowners from
the property tax impact of full-market valuation.
Property taxes, however, do play a role in determining how land
trusts preserve agricultural acreage. Consider prime versus marginal
agricultural land. Holding full-market values constant, owners of prime
agricultural land benefit least from current-use tax assessments. Hence,
they have stronger incentives to find a property tax shelter. Land trust
ownership may provide such a shelter because land trusts are nonprofits
often exempt from tax liability. If so, potential gains from land trust
ownership are proportional to increases in property tax liabilities.
Empirical evidence suggests that some of these potential gains are
captured. An increase in the property taxes paid per farm in the county
or counties in which a land trust operates is negatively correlated with
the percentage of acreage the trust holds as easements. 14 While there are

1 49
the property tax
several explanations for why this correlation exists,

shelter rationale is as compelling as any.
These findings confirm the common-sense predictions that tax
incentives affect land trust conservation decisions. But do tax incentives
trump transaction cost and specialization considerations? Consider why
they might. When a trust purchases a conservation easement, it has
incentives to scrutinize whether a conservation easement is the low cost
option. The land trust faces the full opportunity cost of acquiring
easements that are cumbersome to monitor and enforce: it could
conserve other lands with the money foregone. In contrast, when trusts
accept donations of conservation easements, they do not face the full
opportunity cost of conserving the parcel. Donated property rights
become land trust assets, but conservation easements are not liquid. IRS
rules, as described earlier, generally preclude easements from being
extinguished and alienated. Thus, when deciding whether to accept a
donated easement, an individual trust faces a take-it-or-leave-it
proposition. The trust does not assess and compare the net value of the
parcel in full ownership because this is not an option.

148. For this analysis, only land trusts that protect agricultural land were considered. Id.
at 29-30.
149. The classic land-rich, cash-poor farmer will not relieve his liquidity constraints
much by donating a conservation easement when the difference between market and
current use value is small. In addition, owners of prime agricultural land may be reluctant
to encumber their land with easements because they are leery of constraining their future
expansion opportunities. As owners of the most productive land, they have more to lose if
easements impose long-term rigidities on their agricultural operations.
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For these reasons, land trusts relying exclusively on donations
have weaker incentives to fully weigh the specialization and transaction
cost tradeoffs of full ownership versus conservation easements.
Regression results reveal the effect of these different incentives. As a
group, land trusts that use their own money to finance acquisitions are
especially sensitive to changes in transaction costs and specialization.
Land trusts that only accept donated rights also respond to these factors,
albeit less markedly.150 The results imply that landowners who donate
land or conservation easements consider gains from their nonconservation specialization and that land trusts consider transaction
costs when determining whether to accept donations. These
considerations, however, appear to be of greater influence when the land
trust uses its own dollars to finance the acquisition.
VII. CONCLUSION
Land trusts can preserve and enhance environmental amenities
on a parcel of land by owning it outright or holding a conservation
easement. Data shown here illustrate the fact that conservation
easements are becoming more prevalent relative to outright ownership.
Common sense implies that the trend is driven in part by new and
augmented tax breaks for donating conservation easements, which are
summarized in this article. This article, however, also is concerned with
how changes in more subtle economic tradeoffs have influenced whether
land trusts own land outright or hold conservation easements.
Tax considerations aside, the main economic advantage of
conservation easements is that they better facilitate gains from landowner specialization. Through conservation easements, land trusts can
conserve environmental amenities while continuing to allow landowners
the right to produce non-conservation output. This can be an especially
cost-effective arrangement when landowners specialize in farming,
ranching, or logging and the land trust does not. In these circumstances,
landowners can produce crops, beef, and timber with less effort than that
required of land trusts. The cost savings are passed on to the land trust
(or taxpayers) when the easement price (or tax deduction) is lower than
the cost of acquiring the land minus the present value of any profits the
trust can generate by farming, ranching, or logging.
Landowner specialization, however, does not necessarily render
conservation easements a cheaper substitute for outright ownership.
Because they will always imperfectly divide land interests, easements

150.

Parker,supra note 103, at 28-29.
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create temptations for the landowner and land trust to try to capture the
value of imperfectly specified rights. Such temptation inspires the parties
to protect their interests by specifying them as explicitly as possible,
using time and money in the process. Despite these efforts, some wellspecified interests will still be costly to monitor and enforce. These
transaction costs of negotiating and holding conservation easements
reduce cost-savings generated by landowner specialization.
The evidence summarized in this article indicates that land
trusts tend to hold conservation easements when benefits from
landowner specialization are high and when expected transaction costs
are low. They do so, for example, by holding conservation easements
over large parcels of agricultural land and owning outright land on
which they wish to enhance amenities. These and other findings suggest
that land trusts act as if they are attempting to minimize the costs of
providing environmental amenities. This is good news for taxpayers
who fund land acquisitions and for others with stakes in the success of
land trusts. Despite being not-for-profit organizations, land trusts have
the incentives and wherewithal to search for ways of reducing costs.
Funding easement acquisitions with tax deductions for donating
landowners, however, can discourage cost-effective conservation in
some cases. The findings described here show that tax benefits can result
in trusts holding easements when full ownership would be more costeffective or vice versa. When a land trust lacks funds to purchase
easements and can only passively accept donated easements, the data
also show that transaction costs have less influence on conservation
decisions. In these cases, the landowner is in the driver's seat and the
long-run costs of enforcing the easement do not weigh as heavily into his
decision calculus.
As the popularity of tax incentives for private land conservation
expands,' 5' these findings may have important policy implications. If
cost minimization is a priority, policy makers should be wary of
promoting tax incentives that favor one conservation method over the
other. Researchers and policy makers might also consider whether
alternative funding schemes could better provide trusts with incentives
to consider the full costs and benefits of conserving different lands.
Competitive grants to land trusts that match private dollars, for example,
151. Since 2000, several states have introduced new tax incentives for donating
conservation easements. See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife, supra note 78; AMERICAN
FARMLAND TRUST, supra note 145. At the federal level, proposed legislation would increase
tax incentives for donating conservation easements. See, e.g., LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, NEW
TAX INCENTIVES FOR CONSERVATION, available at http://www.lta.org/publicpolicy/taxincentives.htm (last visited Aug. 2, 2004).
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might better encourage efficient conservation. More generally, policy
makers should not only allow land trusts the room to innovate and
reduce transaction costs, 152 but also determine how to discourage them
from discounting transaction cost and specialization considerations
inherent to the problem of providing environmental amenities in costeffective ways.

152. Readers interested in how conservation entrepreneurs have found ways to reduce
the transaction costs of preserving open space, wildlife habitat, and recreational amenities
on private land, should consult Anderson, supra note 107. Those interested in an exploratory discussion of legal mechanisms that might reduce the transaction costs land trusts face
when engaging in active, ecological management of other people's land should consult
Elmendorf, supra note 116.

